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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court recently held that a public
figure plaintiff could not recover damages on his claim for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress arising from the publication
of an ad parody without a showing that there was a false statement
which was made with actual malice. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell,
108 S. Ct. 876 (1988).
A popular ad campaign for Campari liqueur asks celebrities
about their "first time."' The celebrity then discusses his or her
"first time" with an interviewer; it eventually becomes clear that
the "first time" being discussed is actually the first time the celeb-
rity tried Campari. Hustler magazine ran a parody of this adver-
tisement in two issues, depicting Reverend Jerry Falwell as the
1. Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1272 (4th Cir. 1986).
2. Id. at 1272-73. The ads ran in the November, 1983 and March, 1984 issues of
1
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celebrity and making explicit the sexual double entendre contained
in the Campari ads. The parody implied that the "first time"
Falwell had sex was during a "drunken incestuous rendezvous with
his mother in an outhouse,"' and included a photograph of Falwell
with the text of an alleged interview detailing the "incestuous ren-
dezvous."4 The depiction portrayed Falwell's mother as an "im-
moral" and "drunken" woman and Falwell himself as a hypocriti-
cal habitual drunkard. At the bottom of the page on which the ad
parody appeared, Hustler placed a disclaimer stating "ad parody
- not to be taken seriously."' The corresponding title in the table
of contents read "Fiction; Ad and Personality Parody."7
Falwell brought an action against Hustler, its publisher Larry
Flynt, and Flynt Distributing Company,8 to recover damages for
libel, invasion of privacy9 and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. 10 The court dismissed the invasion of privacy claim by di-
Hustler.
3. Id. at 1272.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1272 (4th Cir. 1986). Hustler apparently intended
the disclaimer to negate any potential liability on its part.
7. Id. Apparently, Hustler and its publisher were not attempting to portray Falwell in
a "false light." The absence of a disclaimer or the corresponding listing of "fiction" in the
Table of Contents might have resulted in liability for both Hustler and Flynt. See New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75
(1964) ("[The] knowingly false statement and the false statement made with reckless disre-
gard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection.").
8. Because the jury found Flynt Distributing Company not liable, it was not a party to
the Supreme Court appeal. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876, 878 n.2 (1988).
9. Falwell brought his invasion of privacy claim under a Virginia statute that states in
part:
Any person whose name, portrait, or picture is used without having first ob-
tained the written consent of such person. . . for advertising purposes or for the
purposes of trade, such persons may maintain a suit in equity against the per-
son, firm, or corporation so using such person's name, portrait, or picture to pre-
vent and restrain the use thereof; and may also sue and recover damages for any
injuries sustained by reason of such use. And if the defendant shall have know-
ingly used such person's name, portrait or picture in such manner as is forbid-
den or declared to be unlawful by this chapter, the jury, in its discretion, may
award exemplary damages.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40 (A) (1984).
10. Falwell, 797 F.2d at 1272-73. Even as Falwell was suing Hustler and its publisher
for emotional distress caused by the ad parody, he was using copies of it in mailings solicit-
ing contributions to his ministry, the Moral Majority. Skin Mag Loses, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1,
1986, at 80. As a result, Hustler sued the ministry for infringement of its copyrights. The
trial court granted summary judgment for the ministry. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral
Majority, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 1526 (C.D. Cal. 1985). Hustler then appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which held that Falwell's use of the Hustler
parody was undoubtedly "fair use." Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d
[Vol. 5:43
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recting a verdict for the defendants."1 Falwell also lost on his libel
claim 12 because the jury found that the ad parody at issue "was so
obviously false that no one could believe it."'1 3 The ad parody de-
picting Falwell could "not reasonably be understood as describing
actual facts about [him] or actual events in which he partici-
pated."' 4 However, the jury found for Falwell on his claim of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress and consequently the court
rendered a judgment in his favor.15 The jury awarded Falwell a
total of $200,000 in damages for emotional distress: $100,000 in
compensatory damages, and $50,000 in punitive damages to be as-
sessed individually against each defendant."
On appeal and cross-appeal 7 to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the court upheld the dismissal of
Falwell's Virginia state law invasion of privacy claim based on the
jury's finding that the ad parody was so ridiculous that it "was not
reasonably believable."'" The Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower
court's judgment in favor of the magazine and its publisher on the
libel claim because the jury found no actual representation of fact
in the parody. 9 Ironically, the court then upheld the jury's finding
of intentional infliction of emotional distress 20 on the premise that
1148 (9th Cir. 1986).
11. Falwell, 797 F.2d at 1273.
12. Id.
13. Cooper, 4th Circuit Refuses 'Hustler' Request, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 8, 1986, at 41,
col.L
14. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876, 878 (1988).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d at 1270. Hustler and Flynt appealed the award for
emotional distress; Falwell appealed the dismissal of his invasion of privacy claim. Id.
18. Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1278 (4th Cir. 1986). Hustler's placement of the
disclaimer at the bottom of the page and the designation "parody" in the Table of Contents
not only took the publication out of the realm of believability but also probably negated it
as a "use of Falwell's name and likeness for purposes of trade" as required to sustain a cause
of action under Virginia's right of privacy statute, supra note 9. Id.
19. Id. at 1275.
20. Id. at 1275-77. The court stated that under Virginia law, to prove intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must establish that "the wrongdoer's conduct (1)
is intentional or reckless; (2) offends generally accepted standards of decency or morality;
(3) is causally connected with plaintiff's emotional distress; and (4) caused emotional dis-
tress that was severe." Id. at 1275, n.4 (citing Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 210 S.E.2d
145, 148 (Va. 1974).
The court then analyzed, in light of these elements, the evidence presented at trial:
In his deposition, Flynt testified that he intended to cause Falwell emotional
distress. If the jury found his testimony on this point to be credible, then it
could have found that Falwell satisfied the first element. Evidence of the second
element, outrageousness, is quite obvious from the language in the parody and in
the fact that Flynt republished the parody after this lawsuit was filed. The final
1988]
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the protections afforded by the first amendment 1 were not availa-
ble to the defendants.22
The Fourth Circuit majority opinion first analyzed the first
amendment in the context of the actual malice standard of New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan" and concluded that the fundamental
requirement of the actual malice standard is "knowing ... or reck-
less" publication of defamatory material. 24 The court implied that
the first amendment would not protect the publication of a "know-
ingly false statement" or a "false statement made with reckless
disregard of the truth. '25 The court therefore upheld Falwell's re-
covery for the intentional infliction of emotional distress because
the jury found that Falwell's injury was proximately caused by the
"intentional" or "reckless misconduct" of Hustler's publisher.26
elements require the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's conduct proximately
caused severe emotional distress. At trial, when Falwell was asked about his re-
action to the parody, he testified as follows:
A. I think I have never been as angry as I was at that moment .... My anger
became a more rational and deep hurt. I somehow felt that in all of my life I had
never believed that human beings could do something like this. I really felt like
weeping. I am not a deeply emotional person; I don't show it. I think I felt like
weeping.
Q. How long did this sense of anger last?
A. To this present moment.
Q. You say that it almost brought you to tears. In your whole life, Mr. Falwell,
had you ever had a personal experience of such intensity that you could compare
with the feeling that you had when you saw this ad?
A. Never had. Since I have been a Christian I don't think I have ever intention-
ally hurt anybody. I am sure I have hurt people but not with intent. I certainly
have never physically attacked anyone in my life. I really think that at that
moment if Larry Flynt had been nearby I might have physically reacted.
A colleague of Falwell's, Dr. Ron Godwin, testified that Falwell's enthusiam
and optimism visibly suffered as a result of the parody. Godwin also stated that
Falwell's ability to concentrate on the myriad details of running his extensive
ministry was diminished. This testimony would enable a jury to find that
Falwell's distress was severe and that it was proximately caused by defendant's
publication of the parody.
Id. at 1276-77.
21. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press
. .U.S. CONST amend. I. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment makes
the first amendment applicable to the States. Note, The Over-Constitutionalization of Libel
Law: Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 36 DE PAUL L. REV. 391, 392 n.5 (1987).
22. Id. at 1275.
23. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
24. 797 F.2d at 1275.
25. Id.
26. Id. The evidence supporting the jury's conclusion that Hustler made the statement
knowingly or recklessly was publisher Larry Flynt's deposition, taken by Falwell's counsel in
June of 1984. The videotaped deposition was shown to the jury. Id. at 1273. The court
identified the relevant portions of the deposition as follows:
During the deposition, Flynt identified himself as Christopher Colombus Corn-
[Vol. 5:43
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The court noted that as a matter of law, recovery for intentional
infliction of emotional distress was not precluded under Virginia
law simply because Falwell failed to recover on his libel claim.27
The court distinguished between a claim for libel and a claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress, noting that the req-
uisite elements for establishing each claim are different and inde-
pendent of one another. 8 The court noted that Falwell had estab-
lished his case of intentional infliction of emotional distress under
Virginia law. 9 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit sus-
tained the jury's verdict in favor of Falwell against Hustler and
Flynt for the intentional infliction of emotional distress.30
A petitition for rehearing was filed and suggestions were made
for rehearing en banc.3' The petition for rehearing was denied.2
wallis I.P.Q. Harvey H. Apache Pugh and testified that the parody was written
by rock stars Yoko Ono and Billy Idol. [The deposition] also contained the fol-
lowing colloquy concerning the parody:
Q: Did you want to upset Reverend Falwell?
A: Yes ....
Q: Do you recognize that in having published what you did in this ad, you were
attempting to convey to the people who read it that Reverend Falwell was just
as you characterized him, a liar?
A: He's a glutton.
Q: How about a liar?
A: Yeah. He's a liar, too.
Q: How about a hypocrite?
A: Yeah.
Q: That's what you wanted to convey?
A: Yeah.
Q: And didn't it occur to you that if it wasn't true, you were attacking a man in
his profession?
A: Yes.
Q: Did you appreciate, at the time that you wrote "okay" or approved this publi-
cation, that for Reverend Falwell to function in his livelihood, and in his com-
mitment and career, he has to have an integrity that people believe in? Did you
not appreciate that?
A: Yeah.
Q: And wasn't one of your objectives to destroy that integrity, or harm it, if you
could?
A: To assassinate it.
Id.
27. Id. at 1276 (citing Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265 (3d
Cir. 1979) (en banc)).
28. 797 F.2d at 1276. According to the Court of Appeals, the defendant's theory was
that "emotional distress was intended to provide tort remedies to plaintiffs who have none,
but that intentional infliction of emotional distress is not available when the conduct com-
plained of falls well within the ambit of other traditional tort liability." Id.
29. Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1276-77 (4th Cir. 1986). See supra note 20.
30. Id. at 1277.
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Several judges filed dissenting opinions 3; the primary dissent
stated that a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress could not logically arise from the publication of the instant
ad parody.34 The dissenting judge explored the importance of
maintaining the availability of and protection for satirical state-
ments in a climate favorable to political debate and concluded that
one common element between a political satire and an ad parody
was their aim to cause distress.35 The dissent analyzed the tort of
libel along with the tort of intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress 38 and concluded that "malicious infliction of defamatory
falsehood" is the only tort for which recovery can be had in the
political arena:"
On Hustler's appeal from the Fourth Circuit, the United
States Supreme Court held, reversed: a public figure cannot re-
cover damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress aris-
ing from the publication of an ad parody without proving actual
malice. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876 (1988).
II. THE COMMON LAW BACKGROUND OF LIBEL SUITS
Under early common law, an individual could maintain a civil
cause of action against the maker of a statement defaming him.3
The freedoms of speech and the press guaranteed by the first
amendment were not available as defenses to such an action. 9 Un-
til New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, ° an individual's interest in
the enjoyment and maintenance of his good reputation outweighed
33. Id. at 484. Judge Wilkinson authored this dissent. Judge Winter also wrote a dis-
senting opinion stating that the denial of rehearing was improper because the panel had
voted to rehear "many less significant cases." Id. at 489. All the other dissenting judges
joined in Judge Wilkinson's dissent. Id. at 484.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 487. The primary factor for determining the effectiveness of a parody or
satire is whether it elicits "discomfiture" or successfully distorts reality. The infliction of
emotional distress on the intended "target" or victim is its primary goal. Id.
36. Falwell v. Flynt, 805 F.2d 484, 485-89 (4th Cir. 1986).
37. Id. at 484. As this Note will demonstrate, Judge Wilkinson's statement of the issue
was the correct one.
38. Note, Philadelphia Newpapers, Inc. v. Hepps: A Logical Product of the New York
Times Revolution, 64 DEN. U.L. REV. 65 (1987).
39. Id. See also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957) (dictum); Beauharnais
v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952).
40. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). When New York Times was decided, the civil rights move-
ment was at its peak. Both society and the courts were increasingly sympathetic to the cause
of Black Americans; this is reflected in the New York Times opinion, which shielded the




University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1988], Art. 4
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol5/iss1/4
HUSTLER MAGAZINE v. FALWELL
first amendment concerns."1
At common law, to recover for defamation, the plaintiff only
had to meet the burden of showing "falsity.' 2 The courts em-
ployed a standard of strict liability to the defendant's statements. "3
Naturally, truth was a viable defense," but the courts employed a
strong presumption in favor of the defamed person that reputa-
tional injury followed the circulation of any allegedly defamatory
statements.' 5 Interestingly, however, the courts awarded punitive
damages only after the plaintiff established "common law
malice."' 6
The traditional defense was to claim that the defamatory
statement was "privileged.' 47 In matters relating to public issues
or concerns, there existed a qualified privilege amounting to "fair
comment."' "4 Whenever this privilege was exercised in relation to
public figures,' e the court would rationalize the defendant's action
by stating that the privilege emanates from the implied duty of the
press to fully inform the public. 50 The courts assumed that the role
of a free press was to ensure the flow of ideas and information to
41. Cf. Note, supra note 38 at 65. The cause of action served at least two clearly iden-
tifiable purposes. First, the "vindicatory" function gave the plaintiff a remedy against
libelous statments by allowing him to "brand the defamatory publication as false." Note,
supra note 21 at 392 (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 569 comment b (1938)). The "preven-
tive" function permitted the defamed person to forestall harm to his reputation by exposing
the falsity of the defamatory statements or rumors before susutained any damage to his
reputation. Id.
42. Note, supra note 21 at 392 (citing Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,
Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 765 (1985) (White, J., concurring)).
43. See Note, supra note 38, at 65, citing W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS § 113 (4th ed. 1971) (citing Hulton & Co. v. Jones (1909)); Peck v. Tribune, 214 U.S.
185 (1909); and C. LAWTHORNE, THE SUPREME COURT AND LIBEL (1981)). Note that under a
strict liability standard, a criminal sanction can be imposed without a showing of criminal
intent to commit the unlawful act. See, e.g. Smith v. Cal., 361 U.S. 147 (1959); Morisette v.
United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
44. See Note, supra note 21, at 393 (citing Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. at 765
(White, J. concurring)).
45. Id.
46. Id. At common law, falsity was not an element of the libel claim, but malice was
presumed if the statements caused damage to plaintiff's reputation.
47. See Note, supra note 38, at 65. See also Branson & Sprague, The Public Figure
Private Person Dichotomy: A Flight From First Amendment Reality, 90 DICK. L. REV. 627
(1986).
48. Branson & Sprague, supra note 47 at 629.
49. In 1974, the Court defined a public figure to mean "one who occupies a position of
persuasive power or importance, or who has voluntarily thrust himself into the forefront of a
particular public controversy in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved."
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974). See infra notes 75-79 and accompany-
ing text.
50. Branson & Sprague, supra note 47, at 630.
1988]
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members of the public in order to permit the citizens to make clear
and informed decisions. 1 Of course, freedom of the press does not
exist in a vacuum. Often, it comes into conflict with other constitu-
tionally protected freedoms and with other protected interests in
society.5 For example, freedom of the press often conflicts with
the societal interest of preserving the integrity of one's reputa-
tion.5 3 At common law, the courts recognized the value of the
plaintiff's reputation and accorded it a great deal of deference
when it was threatened by defamation. 4
However, after New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,5 5 the unqual-
ified protection afforded at common law no longer attached to an
individual's reputation in the context of first amendment free-
doms.56 As the next section of this Note will demonstrate, New
York Times and its progeny constitutionalized libel and related
torts to afford maximum exercise of the freedoms afforded by the
first amendment, particularly freedom of the press." Contrary to
an absolutist's belief,5" however, the first amendment does not im-
munize all types of speech from government regulation. 9 The gov-
ernment maintains power to regulate speech in certain situations
and contexts.6 0 The next section of this Note explores the develop-
ment of caselaw, beginning with New York Times, dealing with
defamation in the context of first amendment freedoms.
III. THE IMPACT OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT ON LIBEL CLAIMS
The landmark case New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,6
presented the question of whether a state's power to award dam-
ages to a public official on his libel claim was limited by the consti-
tutional protections of freedom of speech and freedom of the press
afforded the media under the first amendment.6 2 The allegedly de-
51. See Note, supra note 21, at 391-2.
52. Id.
53. Id. "[Rieputation is a protected interest even if not entirely based on truth." W.
PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 797-99 (4th ed. 1971). "Libel, as a common law tort, granted
the plaintiff the presumption of a good name." Note, supra note 21, at 392.
54. See Note, supra note 38, at 66.
55. 376 U.S. 254 (1954).
56. Id. See also Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976)(rep-
utation not an interest protected by due process).
57. See Note, supra note 21 at 393 and Note, supra note 38, at 67.
58. Note, supra note 21 at 393. "An 'absolutist' view of the first amendment ... would
deny all governmental power to regulate speech." Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
61. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
62. Id. at 256.
[Vol. 5:43
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famatory statement appeared in a full-page advertisement in the
New York Times on March 29, 1960.3 The ad was placed in the
Times to gain support for the civil rights movement, then facing
violent opposition in some Southern states. The ad stated that in
many cases, municipal officers directed violence toward civil rights
marchers. No specific reference was made to any particular public
official. Nevertheless, the Commissioner of Public Affairs for the
city of Montgomery, Alabama sued for libel in the Alabama state
courts and won." He based his argument on the mention of the
word "police" in the advertisement and contended that this word
implicitly "referred to him as the Montgomery Commissioner who
supervised the Police Department." 5 In the majority opinion writ-
ten by Justice Brennan, the United States Supreme Court reversed
the Supreme Court of Alabama and held that a public official
could not recover damages for the publication of allegedly defama-
tory falsehoods pertaining to conduct in his official capacity unless
the public official successfully established the element of "actual
malice."66 The libel plaintiff could establish actual malice by show-
ing that the statement was published with actual knowledge that it
was false, or that it was published "with reckless disregard for
whether it was false or not."
'0 7
In analyzing the medium employed for the advertisement, the
Court held that statements do not forfeit their first amendment
constitutional protection merely because the form of publication
used was "a paid advertisement." ' The Court refuted any conten-
63. Id.
64. Id. at 258. The official based his libel claim on the third and sixth paragraphs of a
ten paragraph advertisement, which stated:
In Montgomery, Alabama, after students sang "My Country, 'Tis of Thee" on
the State Capitol steps, their leaders were expelled from school, and truckloads
of police armed with shotguns and tear-gas ringed the Alabama State College
Campus. When the entire student body protested to state authorities by refusing
to re-register, their dining hall was padlocked in an attempt to starve them into
submission.
Again and again the Southern violators have answered Dr. King's peaceful
protests with intimidation and violence. They have bombed his home almost
killing his wife and child. They have assaulted his person. They have arrested
him seven times - for "speeding," "loitering" and similar "offenses." And now
they have charged him with "perjury" - a felony under which they could im-
prison him for ten years ....
Id. at 257-58.
65. Id. at 258.
66. 376 U.S. at 279-80.
67. 376 U.S. at 279-80.
68. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 266. According to Justice Goldberg, the Court's opin-
ion amply demonstrates that a liberal approach to success on libel claims could have a chil-
19881
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tion that the ad was a "commercial advertisement" ' subject to
greater restriction because "[ilt communicated information, ex-
pressed opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed abuses, and
sought financial support on behalf of a movement whose existence
and objectives are matters of the highest public interest and
concern."
70
In addition to finding that the foregoing factors were implicit
in the ad, 71 the Court noted that the impact of the published ad-
vertisement on the reputation 72 of the alleged victim was another
factor that the Alabama state court considered in awarding recov-
ery for "defamatory falsehood. '73 The Court discredited the crite-
ria used by the state court on the basis of the "profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well in-
clude vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp at-
tacks on government and public officials. '74 In his concurring opin-
ling effect on the first amendment freedoms. "[Ilf newspapers, publishing advertisements
dealing with public issues, thereby risk liability, there can also be little doubt that the abil-
ity of minority groups to secure publication of their views on public affairs and to seek the
support for their causes will be greatly diminished." Id. at 300 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
69. The Court compared the case to Valentine v. Chrestensen 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (ban
on commercial handbilling upheld), and reaffirmed its stance that there must remain unbri-
dled freedom to communicate information and disseminate opinion. New York Times, 376
U.S. at 265-66. Cf. Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748
(1976) (ad that was not false or misleading and that disseminated information about pre-
scription drugs to the public could not be banned because commercial sppech is not entirely
outside the scope of first amendment protection); First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765 (1978) (state had no interest in prohibiting commercial speech even though
speech was not related to defendant's business); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982) (although
states retain the ability to regulate commercial speech, regulation must be no more exten-
sive than reasonably necessary to further substantial state interests); and Zauderer v. Office
of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (state has interest in regulating content of
speech that is misleading, but has no interest in regulating content that is not harmful;
outright ban on illustrations used in ad could not stand).
70. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 266.
71. Id.
72. The word reputation has been defined as: "the character imputed to a person by
those acquainted with him. General opinion, good or bad, held of a person by the commu-
nity in which he resides." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 677 (5th ed. 1983). However, the New
York Times Court would not limit "speech that would otherwise be free" simply because it
will cause reputational injury. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 272.
73. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 267. Under the applicable Alabama state law, the
publication of words or statements which "tend to injure a person ... in his reputation" is
"libelous per se." That criteria is also satisfied if the publication brought the alleged libel
plaintiff into "public contempt." Id.
74. Id. at 270. One commentator has argued that the first amendment protects sedi-
tious libel, and that this is the thrust of the New York Times opinion. See Kalven. The New
York Times Case: A Note on "the Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup.
CT. REV. 191, 209.
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ion, Justice Goldberg concluded that a public official is not without
a remedy against a defamatory publication because he has greater
access to media communication than most private citizens, and
presumably can take steps to correct misinformation.75
Approximately ten years later, in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc.,7" the Supreme Court affirmed its previously formulated stan-
dard for the requisite finding of "actual malice" in a defamatory
publication, and clarified the standard as it applied to plaintiffs
other than public officials." The Court held that a state can set its
own standard for imposing liability on "a publisher or broadcaster
of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual"7 8 as long
as the state's standard is limited by an appropriate finding of
fault. 9
In Gertz, Richard Nuccio, a Chicago policeman, was convicted
of second degree murder after shooting and killing Ronald Nel-
son."0 In a civil lawsuit brought on behalf of Nelson against the
policeman, Nelson's estate was represented by a reputable attorney
named Elmer Gertz.81 The controversy arose over an article titled:
"FRAME-UP: Richard Nuccio And The War On Police,"82 in the
American Opinion, "a monthly outlet for the views of the John
Birch Society." 83 The statements in the article contained serious
inaccuracies including allegations that false testimony was used in
the trial of the criminal case against Nuccio, and that the prosecu-
tion of Nuccio reflected one element of a "Communist campaign
75. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 304-05 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Justice Goldberg
cited Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962), for the proposition that "[u]nder our system of
government, counterargument and education are the weapons available to expose [public]
matters, not abridgment . . . of free speech .... " 370 U.S. at 389. Note that Falwell took
advantage of this remedy by using the parody to solicit money from his supporters. See
supra note 10.
76. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
77. Id.
78. Historically, the courts have afforded more protection to individuals classed as pri-
vate figure plaintiffs than to those meeting the public figure criteria. The latter is usually
deemed to have placed himself before the public and naturally should expect criticism as a
result. Id. at 341-6.
79. 418 U.S. at 347.
80. Id. at 325. Nelson was a 17 year old criminal suspect. The shooting occurred at a
time when the police were "the subject of attacks within the community." Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 997, 998-1000 (N.D. Il. 1970).
81. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 323, 325 (1974).
82. Id. Cf. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876 (1988). In Hustler, there was a
disclaimer on the page where the ad parody appeared and the accompanying title in the
table of contents was accurately labeled "FICTION."
83. 418 U.S. at 325.
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against the police. ' 84 The managing editor of the American Opin-
ion had "made no attempt to verify or substantiate the charges
against petitioner."85
The Gertz Court distinguished New York Times and con-
cluded that a different standard of liability must be used for a libel
claim brought by a private figure plaintiff, due to the unavailabil-
ity of an adequate remedy. 6 In contrast to public figures, private
figure plaintiffs generally do not have access to the media to rebut
false statements or defamatory publications.8 7 Consequently, where
the plaintiff is a private figure, the state may have a greater inter-
est in protecting him because he is often more vulnerable to
reputational injury.
88
In the majority opinion written by Justice Powell, the Court
emphasized that the plaintiffs failure to meet the "public figure"
criteria meant that the state could use a less demanding showing
than that required by New York Times when it sought to impose
liability for defamatory falsehood on a publisher or broadcaster.8 9
The Court reasoned that private individuals should be compen-
sated for injury to their reputation whenever there was "a strong
and legitimate state interest."90 Fault was still required in award-
ing damages for the defamatory publication because state courts
84. Id. at 326. The Court outlined the inaccurate statements as follows:
The implication that petitioner had a criminal record was false. Petitioner had
been a member and officer of the National Lawyers Guild some 15 years earlier,
but there was no evidence that he or that organization had taken any part in
planning the 1968 demonstrations in Chicago. There was also no basis for the
charge that petitioner was a "Leninist" or a "Communist-fronter." And he had
never been a member of the "Marxist League for Industrial Democracy" or the
"Intercollegiate Socialist Society."
Id.
85. Id. at 327. The American Opinion's managing editor was even more culpable be-
cause he:
appended an editorial introduction stating that the author had "conducted ex-
tensive research into the Richard Nuccio Case." And he included in the article a
photograph of petitioner and wrote the caption that appeared under it: "Elmer
Gertz of Red Guild harasses Nuccio." Respondent placed the issue of the Ameri-
can Opinion containing the article on sale at newsstands throughout the country
and distributed reprints of the article on the streets of Chicago.
Id.
86. Id. at 344. "The first remedy of any victim of defamation is self-help - using
available opportunities to contradict the lie or correct the error and thereby to minimize its
adverse impact on reputation." Id.
87. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 304-05 (1964) (Goldberg, J.
concurring).
88. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974).
89. Id. at 348.
90. Id. at 348-49.
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cannot allow recovery based upon presumed 9 or punitive damages
unless liability is based on either "a showing of knowledge of fal-
sity or reckless disregard for the truth."' Although the public fig-
ure plaintiff's failure to show "actual malice" still precludes any
recovery of punitive damages, 3 private figures are not required to
meet the New York Times standard. 4
The policy rationale for awarding punitive damages in private
civil litigation is to deter the defendant and others from future
reprehensible conduct by imposing private fines.9 5 The Court cau-
tioned that publishers and broadcasters cannot be held liable for
punitive damages if the applicable state law establishes a less de-
manding standard of liability for defamatory publication. 6 The
Court reaffirmed its longstanding position against the development
of media self-censorship which undoubtedly would arise if the jury
were able to use unbridled discretion in imposing punitive dam-
ages. " As such, a private plaintiff who has been defamed can re-
cover only compensatory damages for his actual injury as demon-
strated at trial.98
In 1976, the "actual malice" standard of New York Times was
again held inapplicable in a defamation case brought by a private
figure plaintiff. In Time, Inc. v. Firestone,99 the wife of a member
of a wealthy industrial family brought a libel action against the
publisher of a weekly news magazine that published some defama-
91. Presumptive damages are the equivalent of exemplary or punitive damages.
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 353 (5th ed. 1985).
92. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349.
93. Id. at 350. See supra notes 61-75 and accompanying text.
94. Id. at 348.
95. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350.
96. Id. State courts can only impose punitive damages if the plaintiff shows that the
criteria outlined by the United States Supreme Court have been met.
97. Id. The Court supported its position on the award of punitive damages with the
following analysis:
In most jurisdictions jury discretion over the amounts awarded is limited only by
the gentle rule that they not be excessive. Consequently, juries assess punitive
damages in wholly unpredictable amounts bearing no necessary relation to the
actual harm caused. And they remain free to use their discretion selectively to
punish expressions of unpopular views. Like the doctrine of presumed damages,
jury discretion to award punitive damages unnecessarily exacerbates the danger
of media self-censorship, but, unlike the former rule, punitive damages are
wholly irrelevant to the state interest that justifies a negligence standard for pri-
vate defamation actions. They are not compensation for injury. Instead, they are




99. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
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tory false reports relating to the grounds of plaintiff's divorce pro-
ceedings.100 The Firestone Court analyzed the word "actual mal-
ice" to mean that the publisher had either knowledge of the
"falsity," or had recklessly disregarded the possible falsity of the
statement. 01 The Court stated that a private figure plaintiff did
not have to satisfy the "actual malice" standard required of public
figures because the private figure had been "compelled to go to
court by the State in order to obtain legal release from the bonds
of matrimony. 1 0 2 She could not be classified as a public figure be-
cause there was no evidence that she had voluntarily thrust herself
into the public arena or that she had tried to influence the resolu-
tion of controversial public issues.103
The Firestone Court established the foundation for succeeding
in an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 4 The
Court emphasized that actual compensable injury was not limited
to reputational injury in a defamation action. 05 The Court then
clarified its position by stating: "States could base awards on ele-
ments other than injuries to reputation, specifically . . . personal
humiliation and mental anguish and suffering . . . injuries which
might be compensated consistently with the Constitution upon a
showing of fault."'' 0
After Firestone, it appears that a plaintiff in an action for in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress can base his argument for
recovery in tort on such compensable factors as personal humilia-
tion and mental anguish and suffering. These factors are subjec-
tive"07 ; the use of the "personal humiliation" factor pertains pri-
marily to the resulting impact on the particular victim. 08 In
100. Id. at 452. The report was published in the Milestone section of Time magazine, a
section that reports recent details about the private lives of public figures.
101. Id. at 453.
102. Id. at 453-55.
103. Id. If a plaintiff voluntarily assumes a public stance on public issues, the courts
usually class him as a "public figure." For example, in Hustler Magazine, there was ample
evidence to support the classification of Falwell as a "public figure" because he had volunta-
rily placed himself before the public on numerous occassions. See, e.g., Falwell v. Penthouse
Int'l Ltd., 521 F. Supp. 1204, 1205 (W.D. Va. 1981). The Reverend Jerry Falwell is an evan-
gelical fundamentalist minister who broadcasts his weekly sermons not only on national
news network systems but also internationally in Canada and the Caribbean. As such, he is
recognized by millions of viewers. These national viewers and listeners provide a constant
source of funding for Falwell's ministry in the form of contributions. Falwell has consist-
ently spoken out on issues of public concern. Id. at 1205.
104. See infra notes 113-136 and accompanying text.
105. 424 U.S. at 460.
106. Id.
107. See infra note 135 and accompanying text.
108. Firestone, 424 U.S. at 460.
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contrast, reputation evidence depends on the perception or impres-
sions of others, an objective standard.
Finally, in 1986, the Court once again had an opportunity to
examine its position on defamation in Philadelphia Newspapers,
Inc. v. Hepps.'0 9 In Philadelphia Newspapers, a private figure
plaintiff brought an action for defamation against a newspaper
owner and two of its reporters who had written articles implicitly
linking plaintiff with organized crime.11 ° In reversing the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania,' the United States Supreme Court held
that the private plaintiff had the burden not only of proving fault,
but also had the burden of establishing the falsity of the published
or spoken statements.1 12 The Court was emphatic in expanding its
earlier position by stating that the protections afforded by the first
amendment would even protect some defamatory falsehoods in or-
der to protect free speech on public matters."'
IV. A SURVEY OF THE TORT OF INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF BOTH THE
COMMON LAW AND FIRST AMENDMENT STANDARDS FOR LIBEL
CLAIMS
The preceding discussion has explored the standards for re-
covery on a libel claim under both the common law standards and
109. 106 S. Ct. 1558 (1986).
110. Id. at 1560. The Inquirer, a Philadelphia newspaper, published a series of five
articles which appeared in its publication between May, 1975 and May, 1976 concerning a
group of franchise stores and its "principal stockholder," Hepps. Id. The Court outlined the
relevant facts:
The articles discussed a state legislator, described as "a Pittsburgh Democrat
and convicted felon," whose actions displayed "a clear pattern of interference in
state government by [the legislator] on behalf of Hepps and Thrifty." The sto-
ries reported that federal "investigators have found connections between Thrifty
and underworld figures," that "the Thrifty Beverage beer chain ... had connec-
tions ... with organized crime"; and that Thrifty had "won a series of competi-
tive advantages through rulings by the State Liquor Control Board .... " A
grand jury was said to have been investigating the "alleged relationship between
the Thrifty chain and known Mafia figures," and "[wihether the chain received
special treatment from the [state governor's] administration and the Liquor
Control Board."
Id.
111. Id. at 1561. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed Gertz and concluded that
only a showing of fault is necessary to recover on a defamation claim. The state court erro-
neously concluded that "a showing of fault did not require a showing of falsity" and went on
to hold that "to place the burden of showing truth on the defendant did not unconstitution-
ally inhibit free debate." It remanded the case for a new trial, but the United States Su-
preme Court noted probable jurisdiction and subsequently reversed. Id.
112. Id. at 1565.
113. Id. at 1564-65.
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in the context of the first amendment. As the following analysis
will show, the criteria for recovery for the tort of intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress involves a relatively "limited, spotty, and
ill-defined landscape, probably due to the strict pleading require-
ments imposed by the courts."11' It appears that some of the con-
stitutional policies which the Court has expressed in the libel and
defamation cases could be considerably undermined by allowing a
defamed plaintiff to recover under the tort of intentional infliction
of emotional distress, at least with respect to matters of public
concern. The first amendment protections formulated in New York
Times in relation to defamation can be limited under this tort,115
where the injured plaintiff can easily draw on the sympathy of the
jurors.
As the preceding discussion has shown, strong public policy
considerations have compelled the Court to caution against the un-
bridled exercise of jury discretion which might limit free speech in
inappropriate circumstances. 1 6 The Court has long feared that the
imposition of enormous and excessive penalties against the speaker
or the writer could create a situation of deliberate media self-cen-
sorship. 1 7 At least in the public figure context, a court must ex-
amine more critically, claims alleging both libel and intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress, and only allow recovery for the tort
of intentional infliction of emotional distress after the plaintiff has
established his libel claim under the stricter standards required for
recovery in the context of the first amendment. 1 8 The libel stan-
114. Mead, Suing Media for Emotional Distress: A Multi-Method Analysis of Tort
Law Evolution, 23 WASHBUaN L.J. 24, 25 (1983).
115. Id. Mead notes that pleading this relatively new tort either alone or in addition to
a claim for defamation could lead to the circumvention of many of the defenses allowed
under a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 24.
116. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
117. See supra note 96.
118. E.g., Mead, supra note 114, at 50 (citing Beresky v. Teschner, 64 Ill. App. 3d 848,
381 N.E.2d 979 (1978)). In Beresky, a small local newspaper printed several articles alleging
that plaintiffs' son had died of a drug overdose, was a fugitive from justice for failing to
appear at a court hearing for his arrest for possession of a hypodermic needle; and was
arrested on several other charges including burglary. Later, the paper published a letter to
the editor in which the author alleged that Mrs. Beresky had had several cancer-related
surgeries. The Bereskys sued for, inter alia, defamation. The Illinois Court of Appeals did
not employ the balancing test to weigh the interest of the plaintiffs in maintaining their
emotional security against the public interest, but the court nevertheless affirmed the lower
court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' emotional distress claim and concluded that the cause of
action would not lie against the defendant where the plaintiff had failed to show that the
publication was extreme or outrageous enough to impose liability. Id. at 50.
Mead cites a second case, Weingarten v. Block, in which the plaintiff, a former city
attorney, was classed as a public official and a public figure in his action alleging both emo-
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dard used by the Court requires a showing of "actual malice"; that
is, knowledge that the statement was false, or was nevertheless
made with reckless disregard as to its possible falsity.119 The test is
a two-part test in which the plaintiff must prove not only fault, but
also falsity.120
Notably, the test for libel is not outrageousness. Rather, the
outrageousness standard is used as an equivalent term for describ-
ing the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 2' The
tension between the tort and libel causes of action is evident in
Hustler v. Falwell: Flynt's conduct is admittedly outrageous and
intentional,'22 yet as a media defendant, he is entitled to protec-
tion behind the actual malice shield. Courts are reluctant to allow
recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress when the
victim is a public figure, and a media defendant is involved. Any
other outcome would defeat the common law privilege by awarding
recovery based on specified damages under this tort theory.'23 The
tional distress and defamation. The California Court of Appeals summarily dismissed the
count for emotional distress and noted the plaintiff's presumption that the claim for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress would fail as long as he failed to recover on his libel
claims. Mead, supra note 114 at 47 (citing Weingarten v. Block, 102 Cal. App. 3d 129, 162
Cal. Rptr. 701 (1980)).
119. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
120. See Note, supra note 21, at 402. The test is not whether the statement was outra-
geous. See also Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. 1558, 1563 (1986).
121. Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action For Racial Insults, Epithets, and
Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 n.2 (1982) (citing Contreras v. Crown
Zellerbach, Inc., 88 Wash. 2d 735, 737 n.1, 565 P.2d 1173, 1174 n.1 (1977)(en banc)).
The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress consists of four elements: "ex-
treme and outrageous conduct, culpability consisting of an intent or a reckless disregard of a
high degree of probability that emotional distress will follow, severe emotional distress, and
causation." Note, First Amendment Limits on Tort Liabilty For Words Intended to Inflict
Severe Emotional Distress, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1750 (1985). A court can impose liabil-
ity on an individual for causing emotional distress upon a finding that the individual inten-
tionally or recklessly produced severe emotional distress in the victim through his extreme
and outrageous conduct. Delgado at 133 n. 2 (quoting RESTATEMENT or TORTS § 46 (1)
(1965)).
122. Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1273 (4th Cir. 1986). See supra note 26.
123. A different result might occur with regard to racial insults because the victim is
usually a member of a racial minority who might have even less access to the media than a
private figure who is a member of the majority population. One author also notes that racial
insults inflict psychological harm upon the victim, immediately cause harm or emotional
distress, and infringe upon the individual's dignity. See Delgado, supra note 121 at 146. The
Court has long held that racial insults are not protected by the constitution because such
expressions do not add anything to debates and discussion relating to public matters. Unlike
the disputed ad parody, racial insults only serve to hinder useful public discussions and
increase the potential for a breach of the peace. With a few minor exceptions, the racial
insult is communicated only to the victim. However, with regard to public figures one is
more apt to observe the victim appearing before the public to communicate his outrage or to
rebut the defamatory statements. Also, the publication of defamatory statements about a
19881
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Court has implicitly stated that it would expect to see jurors at-
tempting to protect the defamed plaintiff rather than uphold the
constitutionally guaranteed freedom afforded to the press. 2 " The
plaintiff's ability to exploit the sympathy of the jurors, 125 coupled
with the absence of first amendment policy considerations, cau-
tions against allowing recovery on the tort of intentional infliction
of emotional distress involving media defendants. To do otherwise
could severely limit debate on public issues and eventually under-
mine first amendment freedoms. There are additional first amend-
ment policy considerations that underlie the Court's refusal to im-
pose liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress based
solely upon words.12 The Court's refusal to allow recovery for in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress in this circumstance is
grounded partly in its fear of opening the proverbial floodgates of
litigation and the fear of a corresponding increase in fraudulent
claims. 2 17 Yet, despite this clearly announced policy, the courts
have not acted in a fashion suited to acieving these aims. For in-
stance, at least one court has held that the allegations by the plain-
tiff that the defendant intended to cause him humiliation and
mental anguish by his malicious and intentional conduct suffi-
ciently stated a cause of action against the defendant under the
extreme and outrageous standard of the tort of intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress.
2
public figure inevitably will lead to discussion of its truthfulness or lack thereof in the pub-
lic arena. In a few cases, a public figure might act physically against the media defendant.
Overall, however, there is only a slight possibility of such a physical reaction because the
public figure will not want to react in a way that might place him in an unfavorable light
before the public eye. Notably, the slight possibility of a breach of the peace is outweighed
by the Court's concern to stimulate public discussion or debates among members of the
public.
124. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974). See also Mead, supra note
114, at 30. For examples of cases demonstrating jurors' willingness to allow recovery, see
Gallella v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), modified, 487 F.2d 986, 993-94 (2d
Cir. 1973); and Firestone v. Times, Inc., 305 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1974), vacated, 424 U.S. 448,
460-61 (1976).
125. Mead, supra note 114, at 63.
126. See Delgado, supra note 121, at 153.
127. Id. at 157.
128. Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc., 2 Cal. App. 3d 493, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88, 468 P.2d
216 (1976). In Alcorn, plaintiff was a black truck driver who, in his capacity as Teamsters'
Union shop steward, advised a fellow driver not to drive an unsafe truck. Plaintiff's supervi-
sor, who was white, became angry at this advice, and in the course of expressing his anger at
the plaintiff, called him a number of racially degrading names, including "a goddam nigger."
Plaintiff became ill as a result of the confrontation and eventually sued for emotional dis-
tress. The Alcorn court noted that the relationship of the parties was one of employer/
employee and the allegations regarding the victim's particular susceptibility to emotional
distress, coupled with the noticeable trend in greater developments in social consciousness
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One commentator argues that the real threat of allowing re-
covery for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
against media defendants is that it is closely associated with and
continually used with other closely related torts.'29 In fact, inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress is so closely associated with
other torts that whenever a defamation claim is coupled with a
claim for emotional distress, the claims "often rise and fall to-
gether.'130 It is worth noting that the actual malice element of a
defamation claim has a parallel requirement in the, tort of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. Furthermore, .a finding of ac-
tual malice would allow recovery not only for the actual damages
arising from plaintiff's mental suffering, but punitive damages as
well.13 ' In short, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant had ac-
tual intent and knowledge, or was reckless, before he can recover
punitive damages under his claim alleging intentional infliction of
emotional distress.
132
The standard requiring a finding of actual malice for recovery
under a tort cause of action is essential to properly maintain con-
stitutionally protected freedoms. 133 As such, the standard of outra-
geousness has been strictly construed whenever the Court is con-
fronted with a public figure plaintiff and a media defendant.
34
The outrageous conduct giving rise to tort liability has been
classed as conduct which is "so extreme in degree, as to go beyond
all possible bounds of decency and to be regarded as atrocious, and
utterly intolerable in a civilized community," perhaps in an at-
tempt to equate it to the actual malice standard. 3
A major drawback of extending the emotional distress tort to
the public figure plaintiff and the media defendant relates to the
balancing method employed by courts, which favors the rights of
the individual without deferrence to first amendment freedoms.
3
1
The Court consistently has balanced the interest of the public fig-
made the racially derogatory term particularly offensive.
129. See Mead, supra note 121, at 31.
130. Id. at 47.
131. Id. at 52 (citing Cape Publications v. Bridges, 387 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1980), rev'd on remand, 423 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 893 (1983).
132. Id.
133. See supra note 103.
134. Mead, supra note 114, at 53.
135. Id. (citing Beresky v. Teschner, 64 Ill. App. 3d 848, 381 N.E.2d 979 (1978) where
the court noted that liability cannot be extended to "mere insults, indignities, threats, an-
noyances, petty oppressions or trivialities.").
136. Id. (citing Ross v. Burns, 612 F.2d 271 (6th Cir. 1980)).
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ure in the continued maintenance of his good reputation against
the stronger public policy favoring free and unbridled debate in
the political or public arena. In an area dealing with public issues
or public figure plaintiffs, the Court is unlikely to allow recovery
against the media defendant.
V. THE LITIGANTS' ARGUMENTS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell presented the Court with an op-
portunity to review its policy on defamation in a situation where
the private plaintiffs interest in maintaining his good reputation is
in direct conflict with a media defendant's first amendment rights.
A. Petitioner's Argument
The protections afforded by the first amendment of the
United States Constitution cannot be submerged under any dis-
guised state-defined statutory or legal standards. In this case, the
alleged victim meets the criteria defining a public figure and can-
not now bring a claim under the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress because he has invited public discussion by his
voluntary act of entering the public or political arena and taking a
stance on controversial issues.137 Petitioners cautioned the Court to
refrain from restricting the protections afforded the press by the
first amendment and reminded the Court that even statements
categorized as "ill will" enjoyed protection.'3" The policy rationale
underlying the first amendment is to permit "uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open" debate and discussion of issues which impact on
the general public. The attainment of such a goal often involves
even "vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp at-
tacks" on individuals in government, public officials and public
figures. 13 9 One traditional vehicle for conveying opinion on political
and social discourse involves humorous publications similar to the
ad parody. 40 In this case, the jury had returned a verdict in favor
137. Petitioner's Brief on Certiorari, 797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986) (No. 86-1278) Hus-
tler, 108 S. Ct. 876, at 33. See also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964),
and Garrison v. Lousiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
138. Id. at 32. (citing New York Times, 376 U.S. at 275 n.15).
139. Id. at 32.
140. Id. at 28. For instance:
Early in his career, Benjamin Franklin followed the lead of Jonathan Swift and,
in an early edition of Poor Richard's Almanack, reported the imminent death of
a rival publisher. When his competitor protested that he was not dead, Poor
Richard responded that he was indeed "really infunct and dead." W. BLAIR,
HORSE SENSE IN AMERICA, 17-18 (1942). Such conduct would appear to qualify as
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of defendants, Hustler and Flynt, due to the protections afforded
by first amendment freedoms which are maintained by requiring a
showing of actual malice as a prerequisite for recovery by a public
figure on a defamation- related claim.""
Falwell would have liked the Court to adopt Justice Stevens's
dissent in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps'4' in which he
stated that the first amendment does not protect "deliberate, mali-
cious character assassination."' 3 Yet the majority of the Court has
correctly held that even character assassination appearing in the
form of political humor should be given substantial protection be-
cause it provides an outlet for "disguised aggression against moral
and religious pretensions in politics.""' Parodists must be allowed
to continue to exercise their right to creatively criticize symbols
and names which have become a pervasive part of the American
society.'4 5 Traditionally, the American society has been described
as a free society wherein one could uninhibitedly discuss and com-
ment upon major issues without fear of being sanctioned for such
speech. Recognizing this assumption, the Court attempted to draw
some limits encompassing "the lewd and obscene, the profane, the
libelous, and the insulting or fighting words."' 4 These kinds of
words, which tend to "inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace," are outside of the constitutional protection of
the first amendment.1 47 The Court always must employ a balancing
test to weigh the individual's interest in conveying his opinions in
an outrageous and obscene manner against the interest of the state
in maintaining public order and morality in society. ' 8 The strong
public policy rationale makes it unlikely that the Court would give
priority to the state's interest in suppressing such speech, even
where the content of the published matter furthers "only slightly"
the search for truth.
149
In Hustler Magazine, the words and the photograph in the ad
intentional infliction of emotional distress under the standards enunciated by
the Courts of Appeals.
Id. at 28 n.30.
141. Id. at 25-26.
142. 106 S. Ct. 1558, 1565-71 (1986).
143. Respondent's Brief on Certiorari, 797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986) (No. 86-1278),
Hustler, 108 S. Ct. 876, at 33.
144. Pet. Brief for Cert. at 27.
145. Id. at 28.
146. Id. at 20.
147. Id.
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parody do not appear to exemplify the type of words which the
Court had in mind when it drew its limits on any type of speech
which could possibly incite a breach of the peace. 5 ° Historically,
media such as the ad parody have been employed to convey worth-
while ideas, stimulate discussions, and facilitate debates on public
matters. This longstanding policy outweighed any interest Falwell
may have against public criticisms.
B. Respondent's Arguments
Respondent agrees that a balancing approach is necessary to
meet constitutional requirements.'6 ' However, Hustler argues for
the test applied to defamation cases and urges that because there
was no falsity in its ad parody, there can be no malice as required
by New York Times. 52 Respondent, however, urges that such a
blind application of the constitutional rule is improper.
The New York Times decision arose in the context of defama-
tion and "should not be liberally and mechanically applied to all
other torts," particulary those where the truth of the statment is
irrelevant.5 3 It is not properly applied to claims for intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress. This tort theory requires a more sub-
jective inquiry into issues such as self-image and personal feelings
than the inquiry required by defamation or other torts.15 The dif-
ference between libel and emotional distress is important: intent to
cause injury is not an element of a defamation claim, whereas it is
the gravamen of a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress."
Further, the first amendment has never been used to shield
the media from other tort or criminal liability incurred in the
course of carrying out its responsibility to inform the public.'
Hustler's ad parody had no constitutional value157 and was ex-
pressed in a culpable, intentional manner offensive to first amend-
ment principles.' 58 Therefore, the state's interest in protecting
Reverend Falwell against Hustler's intentional infliction of emo-
150. Id. at 31. See also supra note 165 and accompanying text.
151. Resp. Brief on Cert. at 11.
152. Id. at 11-12.
153. Id. at 8. See also id. at 50 ("while falsity is an essential feature of a libel claim, it
is not an element of claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress.").
154. See Id. at 23.
155. Id. at 28.
156. Id. at 19 (quoting Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971)).
157. Id. at 20.
158. See id. at 31.
[Vol. 5:43
22
University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1988], Art. 4
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol5/iss1/4
HUSTLER MAGAZINE v. FALWELL
tional distress outweighs Hustler's right to exercise first amend-
ment freedoms." 9
VI. THE SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS
In Hustler Magazine v. Falwell,6 0 the Supreme Court had to
determine whether it would allow recovery for emotional harm al-
legedly caused to a public figure by the publication of an ad par-
ody at the expense of first amendment freedoms."' The Court held
that in order for a public figure to recover for intentional infliction
of emotional distress arising from publications such as the ad par-
ody, the plaintiff must establish actual malice by a showing that
the statement was made with knowledge that it was false or "with
reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true."'6 2 The Court
began its analysis by reviewing its policy of viewing libel claims in
light of the strong public policy considerations in favor of free and
wide-open debates on matters of public concern.' 6 3 The Court
noted that an important part of individual liberty involved the
"freedom to speak one's mind," which is a fundamental aspect of
the common search for truth in society.6 The Court noted that
American citizens have the right to criticize public figures and
public measures.'6 5 In examining the New York Times standard of
recovery for reputational injury,' 6 the Court emphasized that free
debate inextricably carries with it the potential for false statments,
but some "breathing space" must be allowed for the continued ex-
ercise of the first amendment freedom of expression. 6 7 The Court
concluded that this "breathing space is ensured by the two prong
test requiring both a showing of falsity and a showing of culpabil-
ity in order to successfully recover on a libel claim."' 6 8
In addressing the Hustler facts, the Court once again em-
159. See id. at 20-23.
160. 108 S. Ct. 876 (1988).
161. Id. at 879.
162. Id. at 882.
163. Id. at 879.
164. Id. at 879-80 (citing Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466
U.S. 485, 503-04 (1984)).
165. 108 S. Ct. 879-80 (citing Justice Warren's concurring opinion in Associated Press
v. Walker, decided with Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967); and Baum-
gartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 673-74 (1944) (Frankfurter, J. writing for the
majority)).
166. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876, 880 (1988). See also New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 at 279-80, and supra notes 61-75 and accompanying text.
167. Hustler Magazine, 108 S. Ct. at 882 (1988) (citing Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc.
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ployed its first amendment balancing test and found that the
strong concern for maintaining free debate on public matters de-
mands constitutional protection even for acts done with improper
motive. 69 In applying this principle to the instant case, the Court
found that bad motives, such as the type demonstrated by the ac-
tions of the publisher, Larry Flynt, might control in an ordinary
action for tort liability, but did not play a significant role in impos-
ing liability when the case involved a public figure plaintiff and a
media defendant.'
7 0
The Court then discussed the role played by political cartoon-
ists17 ' and satirists in debate on public matters, and concluded that
in the absence of showing both fault and falsity, these special indi-
viduals would be subject to extensive damage awards arising solely
from their work.17  The Court feared that political discourse might
be severely lessened without cartoonists and satirists because
"graphic depictions, [caricature], 7 3 and satirical' 7 ' cartoons have
historically played a major role in public and political debate.' 1 75
According to the Court, speech in these alternative media for polit-
ical commentary undoubtedly is "calculated to injure the feelings
of the subject of the portrayal,' ' 7  but individuals in society would
169. Id. at 880-81. The Court also cited Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964)
(holding that the first amendment protected an expression of a speaker or a statement of a
writer even when he was motivated by hatred or ill will because the strong public policy
considerations outweighed other competing interests.). 108 S. Ct. at 880-81.
170. 108 S. Ct. at 881.
171. Id. The Court quoted a cartoonist who once stated that: "The political cartoon is
a weapon of attack, of scorn and ridicule and satire; it is least effective when it tries to pat
some politicians on the back. It is usually as welcome as a bee sting and is always controver-
sial in some quarters." Id. (citing Long, The Political Cartoon: Journalism's Strongest
Weapon, THE QUILL, 56, 57 (Nov. 1962)).
172. Id. at 881.
173. The Court notes Webster's definition of a caricature as "the deliberately dis-
torted picturing or imitating of a person, literary style, etc. by exaggerating features or man-
nerisms for satirical effect." Id. (citing WEBSTER'S NEW UNABRIDGED TWENTIETH CENTURY
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 275 (2d ed. 1979)).
174. Traditionally, political commentators have employed satirical speech to criticize
public figures. Petitioner's Brief on Certiorari, 797 F.2d 1279 (4th Cir. 1986) (No. 86-1278),
Hustler, 108 S. Ct. 876, at 34. Others have used satire to attack the view of the world held
by some people as one with a distinct division between evil and good. Star, December 15,
1987, at 30. A satirical work is one used as a vehicle "to expose vice or folly" and can accu-
rately be described as biting, witty, ironical, and sarcastic. THE MERRIAM-WEBSTER Dic-
TIONARY 617 (1962). The main aim of a parody is to successfully imitate the work of another
in a satirical manner. Id. at 508.
175. 108 S. Ct. at 881.
176. Id. The Court noted:
Several famous examples of this type of intentionally injurious speech were
drawn by Thomas Nast, probably the greatest American cartoonist to date, who
was associated for many years during the post-Civil War era with Harper's
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not have enjoyed unbridled political discourse without them.""
Once again, in 1988, the Court reaffirmed its longstanding pol-
icy in favor of free and extensive public debates. The Court found
that the outrageousness standard 178 employed in the usual tort ac-
tion for intentional infliction of emotional distress was clearly in-
applicable when the parties were a public figure plaintiff and a me-
dia defendant. Such a standard would circumvent its policy of
refusing to award damages based primarily on the allegation that
the listener or plaintiff suffered "an adverse emotional impact" as
a result of the speech.
179
Weekly. In the pages of that publication Nast conducted a graphic vendetta
against William M. "Boss" Tweed and his corrupt associates in New York City's
"Tweed Ring." It has been described by one historian of the subject as "a sus-
tained attack which in its passion and effectiveness stands alone in the history of
American graphic art." Another writer explains that the success of the Nast car-
toon was achieved "because of the emotional impact of its presentation. It con-
tinuously goes beyond the bounds of good taste and conventional manners."
Id. at 881 (citations omitted).
177. 108 S. Ct. at 881. The Court stated:
Despite their sometime caustic nature, from the early cartoon portraying George
Washington as an ass down to the present day, graphic depictions and satirical
cartoons have played a prominent role in public and political debate. Nast's cas-
tigation of the Tweed Ring, Walt McDougall's characterization of presidential
candidate James G. Blaine's banquet with the millionaires at Delmonico's as
"The Royal Feast of Belshazzar," and numerous other efforts have undoubtedly
had an effect on the course and outcome of contemporaneous debate. Lincoln's
tall, gangling posture, Teddy Roosevelt's glasses and teeth, and Franklin D.
Roosevelt's jutting jaw and cigarette holder have been memoralized by political
cartoons with an effect that could not have been obtained by the photographer
or the portrait artist. From the viewpoint of history it is clear that our political
discourse would have been considerably poorer without them.
Id.
178. The Court states that in the public arena, the utilization of the outrageousness
standard inevitably would allow jurors to impose liability "on the basis of the jurors' tastes
or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a particular expression" because there is
a subjective element inherently embedded in the term "outrageous."
108 S. Ct. at 881-82.
179. Id. at 882. The Court cites NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910
(1982), for the proposition that "[sipeech does not lose its protected character ... simply
because it may embarrass others or coerce them into action." The Court also stated that it
would not limit the exercise of public expressions merely because the ideas are offensive to
some people (citing Street v. New York, 349 U.S. 576, 592 (1969)). In order to highlight this
point, the Court stated:
[T]he fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for
suppressing it. Indeed, if it is the speaker's opinion that gives offense that conse-
quence is a reason for according it constitutional protection. For it is a central
tenet of the first amendment that the government must remain neutral in the
marketplace of ideas.
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The Court's apparent liberal approach does not apply to all
speech; the Court notes that absolute protection is not afforded to
those expressions which are shocking, offensive, and vulgar.180 The
Court noted that the expressions in Hustler's ad parody did not
fall within any of these narrow exceptions to the general principles
of the first amendment.18" ' The central core of the Court's analysis
revolved around the fact that in this instance, the first amendment
protections precluded the award of damages to the public figure
although undoubtedly he had suffered emotional distress.
82 Jus-
tice White concurred in Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion, stat-
ing that the Court of Appeals judgment penalizing the publication
of the ad parody cannot be rationalized under first amendment
principles. 8 3 The concurring justice thought that the Court should
not have relied so heavily on New York Times which dealt mainly
with a defamatory statement; New York Times is clearly inapplica-
ble in the instant case where the jury found that there was no as-
sertion of actual fact in the ad parody."'
VII. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
As early as the common law era, the courts recognized that the
state had a legitimate interest in the right of a private figure to
maintain his good reputation free from defamation when he had
not voluntarily thrust himself into the public eye by commenting
on matters of public concern. 188 The preceding discussion of com-
mon law assumptions and values 8e made clear that the common
law courts gave the media and the press a "qualified privilege" in
recognition of the press or media's duty to convey information and
stimulate discussions on public issues.
87
180. 108 S. Ct. at 882 (citing Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. at 747). In Pacifica Foun-
dation, the Court expressly limited expressions that were vulgar, offensive, and shocking;
they are not entitled to constitutional protections. Hustler, 108 S. Ct. at 882 (citing Pacifica
Foundation, 438 U.S. at 747). Additionally, a state court can lawfully punish an individual
for using speech which falls outside the constitutionally protected interests if the use of
these "fighting words" would inflict injury by its very utterance or tend to lead to a breach
of the peace. Hustler, 108 S. Ct. at 882 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
571-72 (1942)). In short, the Court recognized that not all types of speech are entitled to
equal first amendment protection. 108 S. Ct. at 882 (citing Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Green-
moss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758 (1985)).
181. 108 S. Ct. at 882.
182. Id. at 882-83.
183. Id. at 883.
184. Id.
185. See supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 38-54 and accompanying text.
187. Branson & Sprague, supra note 51.
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The Philadlphia Newspapers Court must have viewed the
plaintiff's interest as relatively insignificant because it abandoned
the fundamental common law assumptions favoring the private fig-
ure by finding that the individual's interest had been outweighed
by the first amendment freedoms. Thus, it appears as if the Court
has replaced the common law privilege afforded to the press with
an equivalent privilege appearing in the form of first amendment
freedoms.
The Philadelphia Newspapers decision was influenced by the
development of the balancing test employed by the Court when
faced with the exercise of first amendment freedoms relating to
important public matters. Beginning with New York Times, the
Court has attempted to balance the common law value of the indi-
vidual's interest in maintaining his good reputation against its pol-
icy favoring the allowance of uninhibited exercise of first amend-
ment freedoms. In employing this balancing approach, the Court
implicitly rejected the common law premise that an individual's in-
terest in maintaining his good reputation lies at the heart of al-
lowing recovery for defamatory falsehood. 18  In effect, the Court
undermined the strong common law presumption that a defama-
tory false or libelous statement against an individual simultane-
ously caused damage to his reputation '89 in favor of its policy of
allowing uninhibited free speech.
The Court's holding in Hustler Magazine is directly related to
common law principles, and merely serves to reaffirm and expand
the Court's precedents. The Philadelphia Newspapers Court im-
plied that it would be inclined to protect some defamatory false-
hoods in order to fully effectuate the proper exercise of first
amendment freedoms.190 That Court further stated that, in addi-
tion to showing fault, a private figure plaintiff also must show
falsity.'
The Supreme Court relied heavily on the New York Times
standard and its progeny in deciding Hustler. When the New York
Times standard was applied,'19 the second prong, requiring actual
188. See Note, supra note 38, at 66.
189. See supra note 49.
190. Philadelphia Newspapers, 106 S. Ct. 1558 (1986).
191. Id. at 1561.
192. In his concurrence in Hustler, Justice White agreed with the balancing test em-
ployed by the majority and its conclusion that the first amendment freedoms prevented the
Court from imposing liability on Hustler and its publisher because that would effectively
penalize them for publishing the disputed ad parody. Hustler, 108 S. Ct. 876, 883 (White, J.
concurring). In his short concurring opinion, however, Justice White looked unfavorably on
the Court's decision to apply the New York Times standards, which dealt with defamatory
19881
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malice was met as demonstrated by Flynt's testimony at trial.1 93
Noticeably, however, the allegations""' in the disputed ad parody
failed to meet the first prong of the New York Times test regard-
ing falsity, in part because they were not representations of fact.
The allegations in the ad, though certainly serious, did not appear
to be as extreme or as severe as the allegations in some of the prior
defamation cases in which the Court had denied recovery."9 5 For
the Court, Hustler fell doctrinally within established law, not
outside of it.
Following its earlier precedents, the Court subjectively ex-
amined the issues dealing with the publication of the ad parody,
and despite the Court of Appeals's findings of bad motive on the
part of Hustler's publisher, 96 it held that the publication of the ad
parody nevertheless was protected by the first amendment.' 7 The
Court further noted that the ad parody was somewhat similiar to
political cartoons and caricatures which historically have been used
to explore "unfortunate physical traits or politically embarrassing
events."""' The Court examined the ad parody in the broad context
of the first amendment freedoms favoring uninhibited discussion
and comment on public matters, and found that its longstanding
policy considerations extremely outweighed the public figure's in-
terest in maintaining his allegedly good reputation.
Notably, the Hustler Court refused to allow a public figure
plaintiff to assert an independent cause of action'99 for intentional
infliction of emotional distress in the absence of a finding of defa-
mation.10 In contrast to the cases dealing with race relations,
2 0 '
falsehood, to the instant case where there was no assertion of facts in the published ad
parody. Id. He completely ignores the strong public policy considerations underlying the
Court's prior holdings in defamation cases. For instance, in New York Times, the Court
protected an allegedly false statement made by a media defendant in regard to a public
official in his public capacity, in order to fully effectuate its policy in favor of the uninhib-
ited exercise of first amendment freedoms. In that case, the Court held that a public official
must prove that a media defendant had actual malice in making the defamatory false state-
ments. Thus, it would appear that the New York Times standard requires a dual finding of
a false statement coupled with the defendant's actual malice.
193. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 8 and 9.
195. See supra notes 24 and 115.
196. Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1273 (1986).
197. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876, 882-83 (1988).
198. Id. at 881.
199. See Delgado, supra note 123, arguing in favor of creating an independent cause of
action for racial insults.
200. It is surprising that the Court did not examine the Court of Appeals's conclusion
that a plaintiff could succeed on his cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress after he had lost on his libel claim. See supra note 28. The Court's analysis mainly
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the Court would not allow a public figure to have an independent
cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress in the
absence of defamation because of the availability of other reme-
dies.2"2 In sum, strong public policy considerations (concern over
media self-censorship and restricted debates on public issues) cau-
tioned against a contrary result.
However, it is the opinion of this Note that the Court could
have achieved its stated aims without importing the New York
Times standard into the area of intentional infliction of emotional
distress. The Hustler Court also could have found that the event
depicted in the ad parody did not state a cause of action against
the media defendant by using a narrower conceptual framework. If
the Court had looked more closely, it could have found that the
event depicted in the ad parody was clearly related to issues that
concern the public figure plaintiff, the Reverend Jerry Falwell, in
his capacity as a nationally renowned fundamentalist minister. The
Court consistently has maintained that anyone who holds a posi-
tion of persuasive power in society, as Falwell undoubtedly does,
and voluntarily states his opinions on public issues including moral
conduct, as Falwell frequently has, cannot be heard to complain
when his views or opinions are criticized in the public arena, nor
when his credibility to speak to such an issue is questioned, as it
was in the Hustler ad. Therefore, the Court could have held that,
as a matter of law, a public figure subject to this sort of intensive
criticism cannot claim intentional infliction of emotional distress.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The underlying rationale behind prior United States Supreme
Court decisions was that no unnecessary limitations should be im-
posed on the expression of ideas relating to public issues because
such restrictions forseeably could lead to media self-censorship and
possible social unrest. Members of the general public and of the
media should not be denied the opportunity to openly criticize
public figures through relatively harmless publications such as the
focused on the first amendment freedoms without any substantial consideration for compet-
ing issues.
201. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 123.
202. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. In limiting the public figure to the
available remedies pronounced by the Court in prior defamation cases, the Court was in
effect informing the lower courts that they must employ the relatively higher federal stan-
dards when confronted with a public figure plaintiff and a media defendant. In effect, the
Court was guaranteeing that the lower courts would not undermine the constitutional pro-
tections that the Court has consistently afforded to first amendment freedoms.
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ad parody. The Hustler Court was compelled by its precedent, and
by the framework of the American political history to maintain the
maximum allowable protections for statements made in alternative
public media. The continued availability of constitutional protec-
tions for first amendment freedoms demanded that the Hustler
Court reach this conclusion, but it could have done so by finding
that, as a matter of law, Falwell, as a public figure plaintiff neces-
sarily subject to criticism and questioning of his credibility to
speak to certain issues, could not be heard to complain of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress.
Andrea S. Froome*
* The author would like to dedicate this article to her mother, Leila S. Froome, who
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